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We discuss two classical situations that lead to probabilities char-
acteristic for systems with spin-1/2. (a) Pitowsky model: It is
demonstrated that the definition of spin functions does not imply
which circle (a parallel or a great circle) on the sphere should be
taken as a probability space in calculation of conditional probabil-
ities. Pitowsky’s choice of parallels must be formulated as an as-
sumption about the model. It is shown that the model explicitly
avoiding this difficulty is possible and no contradiction with the Bell
Theorem is found. The modification is based on a new pathological
decomposition of the sphere and belongs to a class of hidden vari-
able theories with undetected signals. (b) Aerts model: We show the
importance of the “polarization effect” of the measurements for the
sake of obtaining a non-Kolmogorovian probability model. It is also
shown that the conditioning by a change of state leads in general to
the non-Kolmogorovian probability calculus.
Key words: quantum probability, nonmeasurable sets, Bell in-
equality, hidden variables
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is devoted to an analysis of two hidden variables
models of spin-1/2 [1,2]. Both of them are based on an observation
that a structure of conditional probabilities characteristic for systems
with spin is not a Kolmogorovian one. The problem is rooted in a
non-Bayesian structure of such probabilities, and is typically mani-
fested by a violation of the Bell inequality. Therefore any model of
spin must violate at least one assumption necessary for a derivation
of the Bell inequality.
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The purpose of this paper is manifold. First, I will carefully re-
examine the probability structures of the models and focus on some
aspects that have not been examined in detail by the authors. A
detailed analysis of the Pitowsky model will reveal several delicate
problems of Gudder’s theory of probability manifolds [3]. Variations
on the Aerts model will show that its non-Kolmogorovity is explicit,
and the change of state of the system by the measurement is a nec-
essary aspect of the model in relation to the non-Kolmogorovian
character of its probabilistic description. The fifth variation serves
as an example of a macroscopic system whose non-Kolmogorovity
follows only from the conditioning by a change of state and there is
no lack of knowledge about the measurement.
2. THE PITOWSKY MODEL
Let S(2) be the unit sphere. Pitowsky proved [1] that it is pos-
sible to cover S(2) with “white” and “black” points (= to define a
function S : S(2) → {−1, 1}; x ∈ S(2) is white if S(x) = 1) in such a
way that
(a) opposite poles have different colours (S(−x) = −S(x)),
(b) a probability measure of the set of white points on a parallel
whose lattitude measured from a white pole is θ, is equal to cos2(θ/2).
Strictly speaking the above concise version of the model is not
identical to that given in [1], but this, equivalent form shall be con-
venient for our purposes.
In what follows I shall prove some results essential for the prob-
abilistic interpretation of the “Pitowsky sphere.”
Let S+ denote a set of white points on the Pitowsky sphere S
i.e., S+ = {x ∈ S
(2)|S(x) = 1}, and let Hx ⊂ S
(2) be a hemisphere
with a pole x.
Lemma 1. ∃x∈S(2) S+ ∩ Hx is non measurable in terms of a
Lebesgue measure on S(2).
Proof. Assume ad absurdum that
∀x∈S(2)S+ ∩Hx
is µ-measurable. Let Hx+ = S+ ∩Hx. Its measurability is assumed
to hold for all x, so restricting in no way the generality of our con-
siderations we can take some white x. Hence
µ(Hx+) = 2pi
∫ pi/2
0
sin θ cos2(θ/2)dθ =
3
2
pi. (1)
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Consider now any black point y ∈ S(2). Analogously
µ(Hy+) =
1
2
pi. (2)
Let us define now the following sets:
Ax = Hx\Hy, Ay = Hy\Hx, Ax+ = Ax ∩ S+, Ay+ = Ay ∩ S+.
Let an angular distance δ(x, y) = ε between the points x and y be
0 < ε < pi. Ax and Ay are measurable and
µ(Ax) = µ(Ay) = 2ε. (3)
For any two µ-measurable sets A and B, one has µ(A) = µ(A\B) +
µ(A ∩B) hence
µ(A)− µ(B) = µ(A\B)− µ(B\A). (4)
We therefore have µ(Hx+)− µ(Hy+) = µ(Ax+)− µ(Ay−). From (3)
we get µ(Ax+) ≤ 2ε, µ(Ay+) ≤ 2ε, so
|µ(Hx+)− µ(Hy+)| ≤ 2ε. (5)
Inserting (1) and (2) into (5), we obtain ε ≥ pi/2.
On the Pitowsky sphere a probability measure of a set of black
points on a parallel of lattitude ε around a white pole is given by
sin2(ε/2). Therefore in any neighbourhood of a white pole there
exists a black point, hence ε 6= 0 can be taken arbitrarily small
which is in contradiction with the last inequality.
A straightforward consequence of Lemma 1 is the following
Theorem 1. S+ is nonmeasurable in terms of the Lebesgue mea-
sure on S(2).
Proof. Let S+ be measurable. According to Lemma 1 there
exists x ∈ S(2) such that S+∩Hx is nonmeasurable. Therefore Hx is
nonmeasurable. However Hx is measurable for any x. Contradiction.
Let now p¯ denote an outer probability measure on S(2) (normal-
ized outer Lebesgue measure). Moreover let Kx,θ = {y ∈ S
(2)|δ(x, y)
≤ θ, S(x) = +1}, cx,ϕ = {y ∈ Kx,θ|δ(x, y) = ϕ}, µc-one dimensional
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Lebesgue measure on a circle and pU — Lebesgue measure µ on the
sphere normalized with respect to some U ⊆ S(2), µ(U) 6= 0.
Theorem 2. p¯(S±) = 1.
Proof . Let X be measurable, S+ ⊂ X ⊆ S
(2). Then
µc(X ∩ cx,ϕ) ≥ µc(S+ ∩ cx,ϕ) = 2pi sinϕ cos
2(ϕ/2).
Xx,θ = X ∩Kx,θ is µ-measurable hence
µ(Xx,θ) =
∫ θ
0
dϕµc(X ∩ cx,ϕ) ≥ pi
(
1− cos θ +
1
4
(1− cos 2θ)
)
.
Therefore
pKx,θ (Xx,θ) ≥
1
2
(
1 +
1− cos 2θ
4(1− cos θ)
)
:= fθ,
which implies for any x
lim
θ→0
pKx,θ (Xx,θ) = 1 (∗)
Consider now a triangulation of the sphere, that is, a covering of
S(2) with curvilinear triangles of disjoint interiors. We must take a
sufficiently non-pathological triangulation, for example, the one by
means of equal equilateral triangles. Now, any of the triangles can
be filled with the spherical sectors Kx,θ in such a way that their in-
teriors are disjoint and a measure of their sum is arbitrarily close to
the measure of the triangle. This is possible because in any neigh-
bourhood of any point of the Pitowsky sphere there exists a white
point. Let τ be some triangle from the triangulation and {τn} be a
sequence of sets which are sums of the sectors Kx,θ ⊂ τ , for some
x and θ, whose interiors are disjoint, and pτ (τ\τn) is monotonically
descending to 0 as n increases. Now, for any τ and any 0 < δ ≪ 1,
there exist y(δ) and θ(δ) such that
µ(Kτ )− µ(Ky(δ),θ(δ)) < δ,
where Kτ is a spherical sector inscribed into τ (this follows again
from the fact that in any neighbourhood of a black point there exists
a white one). If we take this Ky(δ),θ(δ) as τ1, then it follows, from the
geometry of the equilateral triangle τ , that, for sufficiently small δ, a
measure µ(K) of any sectorK ⊂ τ\τ1 is smaller than this of τ1. This,
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on the other hand, means that 1 > pτn(X∩τn) > pτ1(X∩τ1) = fθ(δ)
for any n > 1, because the smaller the sector around a white point
is, the whiter are its parallels and the bigger is a probability measure
of X in this sector. The last inequality means that, if we take the
finer and finer triangulations (i.e., the limit (∗)), then pτn(X∩τn)→
1 for any n. The fact that pτ (τ\τn) is monotonically descending
to 0 means, by the same argument as above, that pτn(X ∩ τn) is
monotonically ascending to 1. Therefore the smallest mesurable set
containing S+ is of probability measure 1 on the sphere, because
S(2) =
⋃
τ and
⋃
n τn → τ by definition. This proves that p¯(S+) = 1.
Reversing the roles of the white and black points we can analogously
prove that p¯(S−) = 1, where S− = S
(2)\S+.
The technique we have applied in the proof could be called a
“rastering” of X ; it means that the more precise the “raster” is, the
whiter the sphere. On the other hand, it follows that there exists also
a black “raster,” since in any neighbourhood of a white point there
is a black one. Theorems 1 and 2, supplemented with Pitowsky’s
law of large numbers for non measurable sets [4], show that the
model does not predict the probability 1/2 for an event “x is white.”
Such a choice is, however, consistent though still arbitrary. This fact
means that the notions of total measurability and total probability
in Gudder’s theory of probability manifolds [3] cannot be identified
with the probability implied by the generalized law of large numbers
for non measurable sets (Theorem 5.7 in [4]). The total probability
of S+ is 1/2, while “with probability I equal 1” (cf. [4]) we obtain
any number between 0 and 1.
3. ON PITOWSKY’S PROOF OF
NONMEASURABILITY
In [1] Pitowsky advocated the following theorem (Theorem 4):
Let {S1, ..., Sn, ...} be a random sequence of the Pitowsky spheres
and let z ∈ S(2) be fixed. Consider a subsequence {S′1, ..., S
′
k, ...} of
the original sequence of all those spheres that satisfy Sn(z) = +1.
Let
B = B(z, {Sn}) = {w ∈ S
(2)| 1k
∑k
m=1 S
′
m(w)→ w · z}.
Then
(a) µc(B ∩ cz,θ) = µc(cz,θ) for 0 < θ < pi,
(b) B is µ-nonmeasurable.
The proof goes as follows. Consider w ∈ cz,θ, for some θ, and
take a sequence {S′1(w), ..., S
′
k(w), ...}. This is a sequence of numbers
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±1, while a probability measure of the set of the white points on cz,θ
is cos2(θ/2). Therefore, with probability 1 (in terms of µc),
1
k
k∑
m=1
S′m(w)→ cos θ
Let us pause here for a moment. We have assumed that a probability
space suitable for this problem is given by the parallel containing w.
Note however that the two points belong also to a great circle Cw,z
which is half white and half black. A conditional probability
P (“w is white”|“z is white and δ(w, z) = θ”) (∗∗)
depends not only on the measure of the set of the white points on
Cw,z but also on the way the white set is distributed on Cw,z
2. In
the construction of the sphere (Theorem 1 in [1]) we do not assume
on Cw,z anything but the measure of the white set. Therefore, if
we take Cw,z as the probability space, we shall get (∗∗) = 1/2 for
all w exept w = ±z. From a different point of view it is clear that
it is impossible to cover Cw,z with µc- measurable sets such that
(∗∗) = cos2(θ/2), because then the standard argument based on the
Bell inequality holds.
We can see here an analogy to the Bertrand paradox from the
classical probability calculus: The probability depends on the choice
of the probability space but this choice is not implied by the very
formulation of the probabilistic problem.
Indeed, if we take the great circle as the probability space, then
1
k
∑k
m=1 S
′
m(w) → 0, which agrees with the Pitowsky’s result only
for θ = pi/2. This implies equality of B and cz,pi/2 modulo set of
measure 0. Hence B is measurable and µ(B) = 0.
It follows that, in order to get the thesis of the theorem, one
has to introduce an additional assumption which is by no means
self-evident. The theorem is false as long as the asumption is not
formulated explicitely. The question of its reasonableness is discussed
in the next section; we shall see that it is possible to modify the model
in a way which explicitly avoids this difficulty.
The Pitowsky sphere is an example of a probability manifold
therefore the ambiguity in the choice of the probability space will
find its reflection in probability interpretation of such manifolds [3].
4. “PROBABILITY III”
Let us temporarily accept the Pitowsky’s choice of the prob-
ability spaces for the sphere. In order to distinguish between the
probabilities discussed in [4] (“probabilities I and II”), let us term
Czachor
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the assumption a “probability III.” It means that, if in some prob-
lem we can calculate probabilities by means of different probability
spaces, then we can decide which space to choose and then a suitable
law of large numbers holds “with probability III equal 1.” For the
Bertrand paradox, for example, we can decide which probability can
be realized “with probability III equal 1.” However, such a proba-
bility can be found inconsistent with some auxiliary criterion, as in
Jaynes’ analysis of the Bertrand paradox [5].
As far as the models of spin are considered, a standard additional
criterion of this type is provided by the Bell inequality. So let us
investigate what constraints, if any, the Bell inequality imposes on
probabilities on the Pitowsky sphere.
I shall begin the discussion with a construction of a new patho-
logical decomposition of S(2) and a new version of the spin-1/2 model
for which the Bell inequality explicitly cannot be derived.
For any x, y ∈ S(2), let us define an equivalence relation as
follows: x ∼ y iff x = −y. Let Y be any set and a mapping
f : S(2)/ ∼ → Y
be bijective. Let Rx = {cx,θ}θ, R =
⋃
xRx and Π : R → S
(2)/ ∼
be defined as Π(cx,θ) = [x] = {x,−x}. Let {α} be such a well
ordering of the family R that according to the continuum hypothesis
a cardinality of any Xα = {cβ ∈ R|β ≤ α} is X¯α ≤ ℵ0. Let Yα =⋃
β<α(cα ∩ cβ). Let us consider a mapping Fβ : cβ → Y, β ≤ α
defined as
Fβ(x) = f ◦Π(cβ) iff x ∈ cβ\Yβ
= f ◦Π(cβ′) iff x ∈ Yβ and cβ′ is the first element of
Xβ,x =
{
cγ ∈ Xβ|
⋂
γ cγ ∩ {x} = {x}
}
.


Since β ≤ α is arbitrary, a principle of transfinite induction states
that Fβ defines a function
F :
⋃
β≤α
cβ → Y
such that F |cβ = Fβ . Furthermore, as α is arbitrary it follows that
F is defined on the whole
⋃
β cβ = S
(2) and F |cβ = Fβ for any β.
Theorem 3.
(a) ∀y,y′∈Y (y 6= y
′)⇒
(
F−1(y) ∩ F−1(y′) = ∅
)
.
(b) ∀y∈Y
(
a ∈ f−1(y)
)
⇒
(
∀θ µc
(
ca,θ ∩ F
−1(y)
)
= µc(ca,θ)
)
.
(c)
⋃
y∈Y F
−1(y) = S(2).
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Proof.
(a) Let y 6= y′ and F−1(y) ∩ F−1(y′) 6= ∅. f is bijective hence
f−1(y) = [x] 6= f−1(y′) = [x′]. Π−1([x]) = Rx, Π
−1([x′]) = Rx′ .
Let z ∈ F−1(y) ∩ F−1(y′). ∃!(ϕ,ϕ′)z ∈ cx,ϕ ∩ cx′,ϕ′ (∃! means “exists
only one”). cx,ϕ and cx′,ϕ′ belong to Xα,z where α is an ordinal
number of the greater of them. Let cα0 be its first element. Then
f ◦Π(cα0) = f ◦Π(cx,ϕ) = f ◦Π(cx′,ϕ′) = y = y
′. Contradiction.
(b) ∀a,θ∃αcα = ca,θ. Moreover, cα\
(
cα ∩ F
−1(y)
)
= Yα and Yα
is at most countable. Therefore ca,θ\
(
ca,θ ∩ F
−1(y)
)
is measurable
and its measure is 0. It follows that µc
(
ca,θ ∩ F
−1(y)
)
= µc(ca,θ).
(c) It is obvious.
A discussion presented below of the relation of the Pitowsky
model to the Bell inequality was inspired by the paper by Jozsa [6]
and by an earlier obsevation that the Bell inequality can be violated
by local theories admitting random variables whose domains are not
identical [7]. This further reduces the Pitowsky model (at least its
modified version) to a class of local hidden variables models with
undetected signals. The first construction of this type goes back to
a rather forgotten paper by Pearle [9] and to an unpublished work
by E.P.Wigner (cf. a footnote in [9]) and can be considered as a
hidden variables form of Bohr’s complementarity principle. (Com-
plementary are random variables whose domains are not identical:
For a point which belongs to a difference of the domains one random
variable has a well defined value while for the other one it makes no
sense to talk about its value.)
Let {Sn} be a random sequence of the Pitowsky spheres. Con-
sider a measurement of spin in a direction a ∈ [a] = f−1(y). We
shall obtain a sequence of results ±1. Consider now a measurement
of spin in a direction b ∈ [b] = f−1(y′) and assume that for any
Sk a domain of a random variable bk = Sk(b) is given by a proba-
bility sub-manifold F−1
(
f([a])
)
∩ Sk. This manifold is “almost the
whole” Pitowsky sphere and hence possesses the same probability
properties. For a sequence of measurements in different directions
{a, b, c, ...}, that is, those with different classes {[a], [b], [c], ...} the
domains of the random variables {bk, ck, ...} are disjoint (“type B
random variables” [7]), and the Bell inequality cannot be derived.
The assumption that a measurement of spin rotates a sphere guar-
antees a conditioning by only the previous measurement [6]. Then,
according to the “probability III” assumption, one obtains a model of
spin-1/2, although no contradiction with the Bell Theorem is found.
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5. THE AERTS MODEL
Aerts [2] has given an example of a macroscopic classical system
in which the conditional probability cos2(θ/2) occurs so we seem
to get into conflict with the Bell Theorem. The situation is rather
astonishing as the Bell inequality is, in this context, a criterion for the
Kolmogorovity of the probabilistic problem. It follows therefore that
there exist fairly ‘ordinary’ situations where the classical probability
calculus does not apply.
It is obvious [2,10] that there exist probability models that are
neither Kolmogorovian nor quantum (Hilbertian). A simple example
of such a situation was given by Aerts in [2a]. It would be therefore
interesting to find out which elements of the Aerts model are suf-
ficient for the non-Kolmogorovity of the description. We shall see
that a conditioning by a change of state is, actually, the required suf-
ficient condition. No form of the Bell inequality can be derived for
such models as should be clear from the hidden variables description
of the Aerts model given in Sec. 6. There exists, however, also much
simpler argument for the non-Kolmogorovity of such models. It will
be shown, in the fifth variation on the Aerts model, that the acts of
conditioning by a change of a state in general do not commute.
The question whether one is capable of constructing the quan-
tum probability model based on the conditioning by a change of
state as the unique non classical element shall be left open in this
paper. As long as the concrete Aerts model is concerned two as-
sumptions are needed: the conditioning by a polarization and a lack
of knowledge about a measurement. It is still unclear for the author
of this paper whether the latter condition is sufficient for the non
Kolmogorovity of the description.
We consider a particle with a positive charge q which is located
on a sphere. The measurement consists of the following operation:
We take two negative charges q1 and q2 such that q1 + q2 = Q and
locate them on antipodal points on the sphere; q1 is chosen at random
between 0 and Q and we give the outcome +1 to the measurement
if the Coulomb force |F1| acting between q1 and q is greater that
this, |F2|, between q2 and q. Otherwise we give the outcome −1.
We find that the probability P+(θ) of the outcome +1 is equal to
cos2(θ/2) where θ is the angle between q1 and q. We assume also
that during the measurement the charge q moves in a direction of the
Coulomb force and, after the measurement is completed, remains at
the location point of either q1 or q2 (this depends on the result of
the measurement); we obtain in this way a change of a state of the
system analogous to this due to a Stern-Gerlach device or an optical
polarizer. A reader who is afraid that the charges can annihilate,
may think of masses and the Newton force.
¿From a hidden variable point of view a result of the measure-
ment is fully determined by a pair of hidden variables (q1, α) where
α denotes an “angle of polarization” of the charge q with respect to
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some experimental device consisting of the charges q1 and q2. P+(θ)
is the probability of the result +1 provided the hidden variable α = θ
or, because of the assumed polarization mechanism, provided a pre-
vious experiment — with the measuring device suitably directed —
has given an outcome +1. Note, however, that, if we make another
measurement with the same device sloped by α ≤ θ, then with prob-
ability 1 we shall obtain the same result as before. Therefore we must
assume that either the pair (q1, q2) gets distributed at random after
the measurement or we simply take another device. Both conditions
are referred to as the lack of knowledge about the measurement.
The pair of charges (q1, q2) put diametrically on the sphere plays
a role of the measuring device; we shall denote this measurement by
eα,β with (α, β) being polar coordinates of q. We assume that before
the first measurement q is distributed at random on the sphere with
equal probability in every direction. In the discussion we will simplify
our considerations by constraining all the charges to one great circle
on the sphere. Therefore instead of the pair (α, β) we can write
(α, 0).
For any measurement f = eα,0 we write f = f1 if the result of f
is +1 and f = f2 in the opposite case. We find P (f = f1) = P (f =
f2) = 1/2.
In the following variations we shall be dropping some assump-
tions about the model. In this way we shall localize the element
which is sufficient for the non-Kolmogorovity.
(a) First Variation. Let us consider the Aerts’ model but
assume that during and after the measurement the charge q remains
in its initial position. In other words, we drop the assumption that
the measurement polarizes the measured system.
Now let P (f = f1|g = g1) denote the probability that f = f1
if the state of the system is such that an eventual measurement g
(where g represents the same device but rotated by some angle)
would yield g1.
The probabilistic nature of this situation arises because we do
not know the state of the whole system (= measuring device + charge
q). We shall get g = g1 if
q1(g) > Q sin
2
(
θ(g, q)/2
)
, (6)
where we have denoted by q1(g) a hidden variable of the device g
and by θ(g, q) = θg − θ a polar angle between the points of location
of q1 and q. Analogously we shall obtain f = f1 if
q1(f) > Q sin
2
(
θ(f, q)/2
)
. (7)
Equations (6) and (7) imply the following conditional probability
P (f = f1|g = g1) = 1−
2
pi
sign(θg − θf ) sin
(
(θg − θf )/2
)
, (8)
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which is Bayesian (Kolmogorovian).
(b) Second Variation. Consider the same situation as in the
first variation but assume that the measurements f and g do not
correspond to the same rotated experimental device. In the first
variation the first measurement imposes a limitation on possible lo-
calizations of the pair (q1, α) in [0, Q] × [0, 2pi). If we take two dif-
ferent devices corresponding to f and g, then a measurement made
by means of g imposes no limitations on the possible outcome of a
subsequent measurement made by means of f . This follows from
the fact that there is a lack of knowledge about the hidden-variable
states (given by q1) of the two devices and their hidden variables
are not related to each other. Therefore the second measurement is
independent of the first one, and we get
P (f = f1|g = g1) = 1/2. (8
′)
This probability is also Bayesian.
(c) Third Variation. Let us assume that there is no effect of
polarization but that we know a location of q. Then
P (f = f1) = cos
2(α/2),
where α is the polar angle between q and q1. This probability looks
non-Kolmogorovian. However this is not the conditional probability
as the “condition” that appears here is: “q is located at a given
point.” A probability of the condition is 0 and the Bayes rule does
not apply trivially because we are not allowed to divide by 0 (cf. the
Borel paradox [8]). This probability satisfies all the postulates of the
Kolmogorovian calculus.
(d) Fourth Variation. Consider the same situation as in the
previous point but assume that the conditioning is by “q belongs to
some given set of a nonvanishing measure.” This set can be taken
arbitrarily small so that the model should lead to probabilities ar-
bitrarily close to these from the previous point. One may expect
that the model is non-Kolmogorovian as the Borel-like objection is
no longer valid.
We can try to prove its supposed non-Kolmogorovity in a way
analogous to this from the Aerts paper [2a].
Let us assume that the charge q is located in an interval that
is θ ∈ [α − x, α + x] = Iαx, instead of the location in a point, i.e.,
θ = α. We find that
P (f = f1|θ ∈ Iαx) =
1
2
(
1 + cos(θf − α)
sinx
x
)
. (9)
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For x = 0 we get the required cos2
(
(θf − α)/2
)
; for x = pi we get
P (f = f1) = 1/2. This model can be made arbitrarily close to the
third variation and no conditioning by an event whose probability
is 0 appears. The contradictory constraints derived by Aerts are,
however, no longer valid. Let us follow the Aerts’ reasoning.
Assume that there exists a Kolmogorovian model. We have
µ(F1 ∩G1) = P (f = f1|g = g1)P (g = g1)
= P (f = f1|θ ∈ Iθgx)P (θ ∈ Iθgx)
=
1
2
(
1 + cos(θf − θg)
sinx
x
)x
pi
= µ(E1 ∩ F1 ∩G1) + µ(E2 ∩ F1 ∩G1),
(10)
µ(E1 ∩G1) =
1
2
(
1 + cos(θe − θg)
sinx
x
)x
pi
= µ(E1 ∩ F1 ∩G1) + µ(E1 ∩ F2 ∩G1).
(11)
Following Aerts, we take θf − θg = pi/3, θe − θg = 2pi/3, then
µ(F1 ∩G1) =
1
2
(1 +
1
2
sinx
x
)
x
pi
,
µ(E1 ∩G1) =
1
2
(1−
1
2
sinx
x
)
x
pi
,
and µ(E2 ∩ F1 ∩G1) ≥ sinx/2pi. According to (8
′), we have
µ(E2 ∩ F1) =
1
4
.
Hence µ(E1∩F1∩G1) ≤ 1/4. These constraints are not contradictory.
The point is that we practically deal here with independent events
if we assume that different measurements are made by means of
different (i.e., independent) devices (cf. Eq.(8′)). On the other hand,
if we assume that we make measurements by means of the same
device, then we will deal only with Kolmogorovian probabilities like
those given by (8).
(e) Fifth Variation. Let the charge q be distributed at ran-
dom on a great circle and let the measurement polarize the system.
Assume, in addition that both q1 and q2 are known. For q2 6= 0, the
probability of f = f1 in the first measurement is
P (f = f1) =
1
pi
arctg
(1
2
√
q1/q2
)
.
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Let now the charges satisfy
pi
2
< arctg
(1
2
√
q1/q2
)
< pi.
Assuming that f = e0,0, g = epi/2,0, and h = epi,0 we find
P (first f = f1 then g = g1 and finally h = h1) = P (f = f1),
while
P (first f = f1 then h = h1) = 0.
The probability depends here on the order of measurements, and,
of course, no model based on a probability space can lead to such a
result.
The last variation shows clearly that in models with conditioning
by a change of state a probability of subsequent events depends in
general on the order of measurements. The calculus is therefore
in general non-Kolmogorovian (and non-Boolean). An exeptional
situation arises only in case the events in question are independent.
6. A HIDDEN VARIABLES DESCRIPTION
OF THE AERTS MODEL
A hidden variables description of the model is the following.
(Again, for simplicity, I assume that the charges q, q1 and q2 are
constrained to one great circle on the sphere — it in no way restricts
the generality of the problem.)
Before the first measurement the whole system is described by
a probability density
ρ0(q1, φ) =
1
2piQ
,
defined on a probability space of the hidden variables Λ = [0, Q] ×
[0, 2pi).
A random variable representing spin measurement by a device
Aα (i.e., the one with q1 whose polar coordinate is α) is defined as
Aα(q1, φ) = +1 iff q1 > Q sin
2
(
(α− φ)/2
)
= −1 iff q1 ≤ Q sin
2
(
(α− φ)/2
)
.
A probability of the result +1 in the first measurement is
P (Aα = +1) =
∫
Λ
dλρ0(λ)χα,+(λ)
=
1
2piQ
∫ 2pi
0
dφ
∫ Q
Q sin2
(
(α−φ)/2
) dq1 = 1
2
,
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where χα,+ is a characteristic function of the set of those hidden
variables for which Aα(q1, φ) = +1.
The first measurement changes the probability distribution of
the hidden variables:
ρ0→ ρα,+(q1, φ)= Q
−1δ(α− φ), if the result was + 1;
→ ρα,−(q1, φ)= Q
−1δ(α− φ+ pi), if the result was − 1.
(12)
Hence
P (Aβ = +1|Aα = +1) =
∫
Λ
dλρα,+(λ)χβ,+(λ)
=
1
Q
∫ 2pi
0
dφ δ(α− φ)
∫ Q
Q sin2
(
(β−φ)/2
) dq1
= cos2
(
(α− β)/2
)
.
Formulae (12) provide a hidden variables description of a “reduction
of a wave packet ,” which physically means that the charge q falls
down on either q1 or q2. The measurement polarizes the system
and by means of the polarization process, fixes the hidden variable:
φ→ α.
Is the system of charges on the sphere a Kolmogorovian one or
not?
It depends. If we ask “What is a probability that the system is
in such a state that eventual measurements of f and g would yield
f = f1 and g = g1?” then we shall get the result as in Sec.5 (Eq.(8) or
(8′)), and the system is Kolmogorovian. The conditional probability
obtained in this way does satisfy the Bell inequality although this is
not this conditional probability that can be tested experimentally.
A completely different situation arises if we ask “What is a
probability of getting f = f1 provided in an earlier measurement
we have obtained g = g1?” This is the problem one faces in actual
experiments. The conditional probability derived in this way yields
the correct (and non-Kolmogorovian) spin model if subsequent mea-
surements are done by means of independent devices. There is no
contradiction with the Bell Theorem, because it is impossible to de-
rive the Bell inequality for this model. The polarization mechanism
makes alternative measurements complementary . We therefore ob-
tain another hidden variables representation of the complementarity
principle 2. A difference between the two questions is exactly this
between the models without or with the polarization.
The fifth variation and the hidden variables description above
suggests that the very fact of conditioning by the change of state is
non-Kolmogorovian. Indeed, in Bayesian conditioning a number of
particles with a given property in a sample is the same both before
and after the act of conditioning by this property (“conditioning by
Czachor
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filtering”). In the Aerts’ example the sample may not contain the
charges q located at some given point before the measurement (prob-
ability of such a localisation is 0), but after the first measurement
about half of them is at this point. “A reduction of a wave packet”
in the Kolmogorovian probability takes always a form
ρ→ ρα± = ρ/
∫
Λ
ρ(λ)χα,±(λ)dλ,
where the characteristic function corresponds to a set whose mea-
sure is non zero. In polarisation phenomenon (understood at least
clasically, i.e., in terms of the hidden variables) the act of measure-
ment turns with a non zero probability the state of the system into a
state whose probability before the measurement was zero. And this
is clearly a non-Kolmogorovian behaviour.
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2. For example, let ∀Cw,z∃x∈Cw,zµc
(
{y ∈ Cw,z∩S+|δ(x, y) ≤ pi/2}
)
=
µc(Cw,z ∩ S+)=
1
2µc(Cw,z). Pitowsky spheres with white points dis-
tributed on Cw,z in this way exist. The proof is exactly analogous
to this of Theorem 1 in [1]. Then (∗∗) = 1− θ/pi, if one takes Cw,z
as the probability space. This example seems very instructive.
3. If the charge q falls down on some point then it clearly has not
fallen down on another one. Having given a result of a measurement
we cannot, within the model with polarization, talk in a sensible way
about its alternative: We can think either about successive measure-
ments (then the Bell inequality is not derivable) or ask “What would
have happened if...,” but then we deal with a different problem (in
Aerts’ terminology [2b] this is an observation) and obtain again Eq.
(8) (there is no complementarity but there is no model of spin either).
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